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he Constitution divides law-
making authority in the
United States between states
and the federal government. State
governments can pass laws governing
anything except matters the Consti-
tution says they cannot, whereas the
federal government can regulate only
the things the document explicitly
says it can. 
In regards to commerce, the
authors of the Articles of
Confederation — the first governing
document of the United States —
thought states should have autonomy
to regulate within their own borders
according to their industry and priori-
ties. But uncertain economic times
after the American Revolution made
clear the need for a federal authority
too. Severing ties with Britain also lost
the colonies one of their primary trad-
ing partners, as well as their chief
regulator of trade across state lines. 
The states soon suffered from a
simple collective action problem.
They erected trade barriers to protect
their own citizens, which no one state
had incentive to unilat-
erally tear down while
others left theirs up,
even though everyone
would have been better
off with freer com-
merce between them.
States’ protectionist
policies grew so oner-
ous and retaliatory that
some even feared they
would culminate in
state-to-state combat.
For this reason, 
the Framers of the
Constitution included
the second enumerated power granted
to Congress in Section 1, Article 8 of
the U.S. Constitution, which gives
Congress the right to “regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the
Indian Tribes.” The middle provision
— Congress’s right to regulate inter-
state commerce — became a hotly
debated clause in the 20th century.
The debate has been renewed today in
light of recent federal legislation con-
cerning health care reform, which
requires citizens within states to
undertake a specific form of com-
merce (i.e., purchase insurance). 
It’s always an open question as to
whether the Supreme Court will take
up legal challenges to new legislation
based on commerce clause grounds.
Understanding the legal history of the
clause can help the public put the 
current debate in context.   
The Birth of Federal Regulation
The Commerce Clause was rarely
invoked for the first 100 years of the
U.S.’s history. During that time it was
mostly used under the purpose the
Framers envisioned: to mitigate state
trade barriers that would hinder inter-
state commerce, such as taxes levied
on goods produced in other states. 
But the industrial revolution made
states more economically interdepend-
ent than ever. The stakes on interstate
commerce were now higher and
brought new questions about what
constituted interstate commerce. 
Not surprisingly, the rise of the rail-
roads — then the literal vehicles of
interstate commerce — became an
early test of the boundaries of state
versus federal regulation. In the late
1800s, the transport of bulk items like
grain, lumber, and coal was the rail-
roads’ main business. But it wasn’t that
profitable. Competition from water
carriers forced railroads to keep rates
low, and railroads increasingly used
profits from local delivery services to
recoup fixed costs on less-profitable
bulk transport services. 
The growth of local delivery 
business also made it affordable 
for railroads to draw freight business
from competitors by offering favored 
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localities, a practice called price discrimination. This bred
public frustration especially from farmers in far-flung 
geographic areas who were on the losing end of the deal.
States tried to limit price discrimination through 
regulation, but their rules could extend only as far as their
borders. In 1886 the Supreme Court ruled that the state 
of Illinois had actually overstepped its bounds in regulating
railroads, and Congress intervened in 1887 by creating the
first-ever federal regulatory agency, the Interstate Commerce
Commission. The ICC allowed railroads to continue 
charging a markup on local delivery services to recoup the
fixed costs of bulk transport, but they could no longer offer
discounted pricing and rebates to certain customers over oth-
ers. The primary goal was to maximize access to services.
Though the ICC was a direct answer to widespread 
public frustration with railroads, it is telling that railroads
supported the legislation. They sought an end to the price
wars, secret rebates, and price concessions offered to cus-
tomers to garner business, but also hoped the ICC would
strengthen the railroad cartel. Indeed, the ICC helped the
railroad industry evolve from a private cartel to a publicly
managed one, noted the late economist Marcus Alexis of
Northwestern University in 1982. 
The ICC is now regarded as a classic example of “regula-
tory capture,” in which regulators end up sympathizing with
the regulated and enact rules in their favor. For example, in
the Transportation Act of 1920, Congress allowed the ICC
to regulate minimum, not just maximum, shipping rates, as
well as control entry into and exit from the industry, among
other issues. Contrary to the original intention of Congress
to widen competition, the ICC eventually came to have the
opposite effect.
The New Deal Court
The ICC would not be the last example of public agitation
prompting federal regulatory action. Starting in 1933, a
sweeping batch of New Deal economic sanctions was passed
under President Franklin Roosevelt to deal with the Great
Depression. Roosevelt, based in part on counsel from econ-
omists, thought the Depression was a product of unbridled
and “unfair” competition that kept wages low and sup-
pressed demand. The answer, in his view, was a heavier
government hand in managing the economy.
The government created the National Recovery
Administration (NRA) to enforce price and wage controls,
in part by establishing “fair competition codes.” The codes
set maximum hours for the workweek, prohibited child
labor, and set minimum wages. Virtually no industry was
exempted.
The strict controls on competition proved difficult 
to enforce. Producers began finding ways around the 
codes, such as a group of immigrant brothers in Brooklyn
who ran a business slaughtering chickens and selling them 
to retailers within the state of New York. The Schechter 
brothers were charged with selling unfit and diseased 
chickens at discounted prices, among other violations. They
were convicted by the
government and fined
before they appealed
the decision. Since their
chickens were being
sold solely within New
York State lines, the
brothers said, the feder-
al government had no
authority to regulate
them through the NRA.
The Supreme Court
agreed in 1935’s A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States. The Court interpreted
the Constitution to mean that Congress could regulate com-
merce between states; Congress could not, however,
delegate those authorities to the president. The Roosevelt
administration held that transactions which wouldn’t 
ordinarily have a substantial effect on interstate commerce
may do so in an “emergency,” when the national economy 
is more interdependent. But even though the national 
economic emergency may justify extraordinary measures,
wrote Chief Justice Hughes in the Court’s ruling against the
government, it did not justify an expansion of the govern-
ment’s constitutional powers. 
The political implications became as evident as the legal
ones. After the Schechter ruling, Justice Louis Brandeis made
a point of pulling aside one of Roosevelt’s aides to warn that
the decision was “the end of this business of centralization.”
His words were prophetic, as 1935 and 1936 saw a series of
“Black Mondays” in which the Supreme Court repeatedly
struck down attempts by Congress to enact New Deal 
programs.
But the president would not take this lying down. In early
1937 Roosevelt pitched a proposal to add another justice to
the Supreme Court for each existing justice over the age of
70, to ease the case burdens of the older judges, he said. The
real goal was to pack the Court with justices sympathetic to
New Deal policies. 
Soon thereafter, a justice switched sides on another New
Deal constitutionality case and the Court ruled in favor of
the government. The justice’s change in position became
known as the “switch in time that saved nine.” The justices
held that Roosevelt’s threat did not affect the outcome of
the case, but many legal scholars are not convinced. 
In the years that followed, the seemingly chastened
Court overturned many of its previous rulings limiting 
federal government power. An era was born in which the
Court deferred to Congress on all matters of economic 
regulation. The new trend was amplified in 1942 in what was
arguably the single greatest expansion of federal regulatory
power in the history of Commerce Clause case law. 
At the time, the nation’s wheat growers were restricted to
a limited crop size under a Depression-era policy created 
to moderate (some say raise) national wheat prices. Roscoe
Filburn, a farmer in Ohio, exceeded the limit to feed his 
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livestock and family. He was fined and ordered to destroy
the extra wheat, but he appealed. The wheat was intended
for private use and would never come to market, he said, so
the government’s wheat limits should not apply.
The Supreme Court agreed with the government in
1942’s  Wickard v. Filburn. The extra wheat Filburn grew 
constituted wheat he would not buy commercially, the
Court said, and therefore affected the interstate wheat mar-
ket. Furthermore, though Filburn’s actions alone were not
likely to have a noticeable effect on interstate commerce, if
many individuals followed suit the cumulative effect surely
would be substantial. 
For the next 50 years, legislation passed by Congress
assumed a continually expanding interpretation of its
authority to regulate, and every related case taken by 
the Supreme Court was decided in the government’s 
favor. Not that there was much public objection to this
trend. 
Congress’s broader interpretation of Commerce Clause
authority led to some widely lauded legislative achievements
such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and other enhancements
of civil liberties. The courts, by comparison, looked rudder-
less in commercial cases. Lower courts lacked a clear
framework by which to interpret the many cases that rested
vaguely on the Commerce Clause, and different federal
appeals courts reached conflicting conclusions. Congress
was effectively the arbiter of the lines between federal and
state power during this period.
Defining the Limits
Apivotal 1995 case came as a surprise. After a 12th grade boy
carried a loaded gun into his school, he was convicted under
the federal Gun-Free School Zone Act of 1990 (GFSZA) that
made it illegal for an individual to possess a concealed
firearm within 1,000 feet of a known school zone. 
The government had justified the GFSZA under its
authority to regulate interstate commerce. Yet the link
between gun violence and commerce, let alone the interstate
variety, was not obvious. Previous Commerce Clause rulings
had established that an activity would need to affect inter-
state commerce on one of three levels for Congress to
regulate it. First, the activity could relate to the channels of
interstate commerce, such as railroads, waterways, or
streets. Second, it could affect the “instrumentalities” of
commerce, or the people and things that are conduits of eco-
nomic activity. That left only the third and hardest to define
class of activity: those with a “substantial effect” on inter-
state commerce. 
This is where the government made its case. Guns likely
lead to violence, it contended, which would disrupt the 
educational process and impair the future productivity of
affected children. If enough people did it, the health of the
economy as a whole would be impaired. 
But under the federal government’s logic, the Court
argued, Congress would have the power to regulate any
activity that might conceivably lead to a violent crime. It was
hard to imagine anything that couldn’t meet this threshold.
It was not enough to “pile inference upon inference” to 
connect an activity to interstate commerce. In actuality, the
GFSZA neither dealt with a commercial activity nor
required that the gun possession it prohibited be in any way
connected to interstate commerce. The Court ruled in 1995’s
United States v. Lopez against the government and the
GFSZAwas invalidated.
A case in 2000 echoed the Lopez ruling. A female 
student at Virginia Tech was sexually assaulted and sought
federal recourse under a portion of the 1994’s Violence
Against Women Act (VAWA) that allowed victims of gen-
der-motivated crimes to file a federal case against attackers.
The VAWA exceeded congressional power, the Supreme
Court ruled in United States v. Morrison, which named one of
the alleged attackers as the defendant. The violent act of one
party against another was not economic in nature — despite
the potential economic harm that might result for the 
victim — and therefore had no conceivable impact on 
interstate commerce.
Morrison also strengthened the Lopez result. In contrast
to the Lopez case, the VAWA legislation provided ample 
evidence of the economic effects of gender-motivated 
violence. But the Court stood that Congress could not reg-
ulate noneconomic crime of one person against another
based solely on the possibility that the cumulative effect of
many similar acts of that crime could affect interstate 
commerce. This differed from the Wickard case, in which
cumulative effects of economic activity were deemed
appropriate federal jurisdiction. To allow Congress to regu-
late any activity that in any remote way affects commerce
would be to confer onto Congress general police power over
the nation, the Court said. That could somewhat eradicate
the federated structure secured by the Constitution.
Although the Court seemed to be ending its long-stand-
ing deference to Congress, remnants of that deference
remained. The Court ruled in 2005’s Gonzales v. Raich against
an ill California resident who had grown marijuana for
medicinal use, which was valid under California law but pro-
hibited nationally. There was indeed an established, albeit
illegal, market for marijuana, the Court said. Like the
Depression-era wheat farming in Wickard, a booming 
black market for marijuana could raise prices and draw
homegrown product into the market, counteracting the gov-
ernment’s efforts to limit commercial transactions in the
drug. Justice Scalia wrote in a clarifying opinion that
Congress could regulate purely intrastate activities, even if
they don’t “substantially” affect interstate commerce, if they
could otherwise undercut its ability to regulate interstate
commerce.
What’s at Stake
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s dissent in Raich reiterated
that the Supreme Court’s role is to enforce the outer limits
of Congress’s Commerce Clause authority to protect state
sovereignty from a gradual encroachment of federal power.Region Focus | Second Quarter | 2010  35
It is difficult to imagine in advance how any precedent might
be applied in the future toward this end without knowing
the specifics of the cases that will arise.
Take, for example, health care legislation passed in March
2010, the most recent arena in which Commerce Clause
breaches have been alleged. The law requires all U.S. citizens
to purchase health insurance or be subject to a fine. Critics
point out that health insurance is strictly intrastate; it is 
regulated by states and historically has never been purchased
across state borders. 
The other side recalls the Wickard and Raich rulings, in
which the Supreme Court allowed Congress to regulate
activities that aren’t strictly interstate commerce but have
the potential to “substantially” affect interstate commerce,
or that impede Congress’s regulation of a market the
Commerce Clause might say is valid to regulate, such as that
for health care. 
But the health care question contains something new.
The Commerce Clause says Congress has the right to regu-
late certain activities — but can it regulate the failure to
engage in an activity like the purchase of health insurance?
What if said inactivity “substantially” affects a regulated
class of interstate commerce? It’s not immediately clear how
the legal precedents established by the Supreme Court apply
in these examples.
Answering such questions may not be easy. Many of the
same debates held by the Framers over the proper balance of
authority are still very much alive today.  RF
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endowed society’s most famous institutions. Those gifts
have also enabled prototypes, such as the nation’s 911 emer-
gency response system and the Pell Grant program that
sends poor students to college. Nonprofit grants from
Carnegie and other foundations even gave the private, non-
profit National Bureau of Economic Research an initial leg
up in the 1920s. More recently, Warren Buffett announced
his gift of $31 billion to the Bill and Melinda Gates
Foundation. That’s more than twice — in 2006 dollars —
the combined amount Carnegie and Rockefeller gave in
their day.  
While individuals make up three-fourths of charitable 
giving, less than 2 percent of households actually give accord-
ing to a traditional religious “tithe” — 10 percent of income.
The norm is 1 percent to 2 percent of average income.
Contributions to groups that supply basic needs, such 
as homeless shelters or food banks, grew by 3.7 percent 
after a decline the previous year. Religious giving barely
budged, with a 0.3 percent decline. “Combination organiza-
tions,” such as United Way and the United Jewish Appeal,
received more in contributions in 2008; giving to that 
category fell by 4.2 percent in 2009. 
People give money when they feel secure based on the
value of their assets, and the connection between changes in
the stock market and giving has strengthened. Estimates
associate a 10 point increase in the Dow Jones Industrial
average with $16 million more in charitable giving, and a 
$1 billion increase in personal income associated with 
$15 million more. “We particularly see the DJIA more
important in the post-World War era, as more households
own financial assets,” Osili says. “We are watching personal
income closely. Based on historical patterns of recovery, 
personal income will have a robust impact on giving.”
The outlook for giving remains uncertain. Wider partici-
pation in financial markets affects philanthropy today more
than in previous downturns, and policy changes could also
inhibit gifts. But philanthropic professionals are pinning
hopes for recovery on other dissimilarities: higher per-
capita income, a greater percentage of college graduates, and
more households supporting secular causes.  RF
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